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Abstract—Cloud computing has changed the way enterprises
store, access and share data. Data is constantly being uploaded to
the cloud and shared within an organization built on a hierarchy
of many different individuals that are given certain data access
privileges. With more data storage needs turning over to the
cloud, finding a secure and efficient data access structure has
become a major research issue. With different access privileges,
individuals with more privileges (at higher levels of the hier-
archy) are granted access to more sensitive data than those
with fewer privileges (at lower levels of the hierarchy). In this
paper, a Privilege-based Multilevel Organizational Data-sharing
scheme (P-MOD) is proposed that incorporates a privilege-based
access structure into an attribute-based encryption mechanism
to handle these concerns. Each level of the privilege-based access
structure is affiliated with an access policy that is uniquely
defined by specific attributes. Data is then encrypted under each
access policy at every level to grant access to specific data users
based on their data access privileges. An individual ranked at a
certain level can decrypt the ciphertext (at that specific level) if
and only if that individual owns a correct set of attributes that can
satisfy the access policy of that level. The user may also decrypt
the ciphertexts at the lower levels with respect to the user’s level.
Security analysis shows that P-MOD is secure against adaptively
chosen plaintext attack assuming the DBDH assumption holds.
The comprehensive performance analysis demonstrates that P-
MOD is more efficient in computational complexity and storage
space than the existing schemes in secure data sharing within an
organization.
Index Terms—Cloud-based data storage, hierarchy, privilege-
based access, sensitive data, attribute-based encryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
It was estimated that data breaches cost the United
States’ healthcare industry approximately $6.2 billion in 2016
alone [1]. To mitigate financial loss and implications on the
reputation associated with data breaches, large multilevel orga-
nizations, such as healthcare networks, government agencies,
banking institutions, commercial enterprises and etc., began
allocating resources into data security research to develop and
improve accessibility and storage of highly sensitive data.
One major way that large enterprises are adapting to in-
creased sensitive data management is the utilization of the
cloud environment. It was reported that more than half of all
U.S. businesses have turned over to the cloud for their business
data management needs [2]. The on-demand cloud access and
data sharing can greatly reduce data management cost, storage
flexibility, and capacity [3]. However, data owners have deep
concerns when sharing data on the cloud due to security issues.
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Once uploaded and shared, the data owner inevitably loses
control over the data, opening the door to unauthorized data
access.
A critical issue for data owners is how to efficiently and
securely grant privilege level-based access rights to a set of
data. Data owners are becoming more interested in selectively
sharing information with data users based on different levels
of granted privileges. The desire to grant level-based access
results in higher computational complexity and complicates
the methods in which data is shared on the cloud. Research
in this field focuses on finding enhanced schemes that can
securely, efficiently and intelligently share data on the cloud
among users according to granted access levels.
Based on a study conducted by the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), Role-Based Access Con-
trol (RBAC) models are the most widely used to share data
in hierarchical enterprises of 500 or more individuals [4].
RBAC models aim to restrict system access to authorized
users as they provide access control mechanisms. The access
control mechanisms are based on predefined and fixed roles
making the models identity-centric. Each individual within
the organization is assigned to a role that defines the user’s
privileges. However, the limitations of this model are evident
when presented with a large complex matrix of data users in
an organization. The foundation of RBAC is based on abstract
choices for roles. This would require a continuously increasing
number of RBAC roles to properly encapsulate the privileges
assigned to each user of the system. Managing a substantial
number of rules can become a resource-intensive task, referred
to as role explosion [5].
To better comprehend the importance of this study, consider
the scenario where patients share their Public Health Records
(PHR) on the cloud to be accessed by health providers and
administrators of a hospital. In most cases, the patient wishes
to grant the physician access to most parts of the PHR
(including its most sensitive parts, e.g. medical history) while
granting an administrator access to limited parts that are less
sensitive (e.g. date of birth). In order to achieve that, the patient
needs to define a hierarchy of data access privileges ranking
various types of hospital employees. Next, the patient needs
to clarify the privileges at each level to define what each data
user can access. It is important to realize that each patient
may wish to encrypt his/her PHR differently. For example,
the patient might grant access to the most sensitive parts of
his/her PHR to only specific physicians while denying others.
This allows the patient full control in defining the hierarchy,
which is not fixed or predefined by the hospital.
In this paper, a Privilege-based Multilevel Organizational
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2Data-sharing scheme (P-MOD) is proposed to solve the
problems of sharing data within organizations with complex
hierarchies. First, the scheme proposes to partition a data file
into multiple parts of different sensitivity. Next, each part is
symmetrically encrypted. The keys used in encryption serve
as the actual data shared to users. The scheme then proposes
an access structure that ranks data users of an organization
into different privileged levels. Each level is associated with an
access tree that defines the privileges pertaining to data users at
each specific level. Each part of the data file is then encrypted
once in a hierarchical manner to grant different access rights
to the users based on their level within the hierarchy. The
process of encryption and decryption is based on an Attribute
Based Encryption (ABE) architecture that can achieve fine-
granularity when assigning privileges.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the related work is reviewed. In Section III, preliminaries are
introduced that summarize key concepts used in this research.
Next, in Section IV, the problem formulation is described
outlining the system model and design goals. In Section V,
the proposed scheme, P-MOD is introduced. Following that,
in Section VI we formally prove the security of P-MOD based
on the hardness of the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
(DBDH) problem. In Section VII, performance analysis of P-
MOD is conducted and compared with two other schemes [6],
[7]. Finally, in Section IX, a conclusion is drawn to summarize
the work done in this research.
II. RELATED WORK
Fuzzy Identity-Base Encryption (Fuzzy IBE) was introduced
in [8] to handle data sharing on the cloud in a flexible approach
using encryption. The ciphertext is shared on the cloud to
restrict access to authorized users. In order for an authorized
individual to obtain the data, the user must request a private
key from a key-issuer to decrypt the encrypted data. Fuzzy IBE
is a specific type of function encryption [9] in which both
the data user’s private key and ciphertext are affiliated with
attributes. Attributes are descriptive pieces of information that
can be assigned to any user or object. Since attributes can be
any variable, they provide more flexibility when granting data
access. The scheme enables a set of descriptive attributes to
be associated with a data user’s private key and the ciphertext
shared on the cloud. If the data user’s private key incorporates
the minimum threshold requirement of attributes that match
those integrated within the ciphertext, the data user can decrypt
it. Although this scheme allows complex systems to be easily
defined using attributes, it becomes less efficient when used
to express large systems or when the number of attributes
increases.
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) schemes later emerged
to provide more versatility when sharing data. These schemes
integrate two types of constructs: attributes and access policies.
Access policies are statements that join attributes to express
which users of the system are granted access and which
users are denied. ABE schemes were introduced via two
different approaches: Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
(KP-ABE) and Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
(CP-ABE). KP-ABE was initially introduced in [10]. In KP-
ABE, each ciphertext is labeled with a set of descriptive
attributes, while each private key is integrated with an access
policy. For authorized data users to decrypt the ciphertext,
they must first obtain a private key from the key-issuer to
use in decryption. The key-issuer integrates the access policy
into the keys generated. Data users can successfully decrypt
a ciphertext if the set of descriptive attributes associated with
the ciphertext satisfies the access policy integrated within their
private keys. KP-ABE can achieve fine-grained access control
and is more flexible than Fuzzy IBE. However, the data owner
must trust the key-issuer to only issue private keys to data users
granted the privilege of access. This is a limitation since the
data owner ultimately forfeits control over which data users
are granted access.
CP-ABE is another approach that was later proposed in [7].
It is considered to be conceptually similar to Role-Based Ac-
cess Control (RBAC) [11]. However, CP-ABE gives the data
owner control over which data user is able to decrypt certain
ciphertexts. This is due to the access structure being integrated
by the data owner into the ciphertext during encryption. It
allows the private key generated by the key-issuer to only
contain the set of attributes possessed by the data user. Several
enhanced CP-ABE schemes [12]–[15] were later introduced
that can provide higher flexibility and better efficiency.
Most attribute-based encryption schemes such as Fuzzy
IBE, KP-ABE, and CP-ABE serve as a better solution when
data users are not ranked into a hierarchy and each is inde-
pendent of one another (i.e. no relationships). However, they
share a common limitation of high computational complexity
in the case of large multilevel organizations. These schemes
require a single data file to be encrypted with a large number
of attributes (from different levels) to grant them access to it.
Hierarchical Attribute-Based Encryption (HABE) that com-
bines the Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) [16]
scheme and CP-ABE was later introduced in [17]. HABE is
able to achieve fine-grained access control in a hierarchical
organization. It consists of a root master that generates and
distributes parameters and keys, multiple domain masters that
delegate keys to domain masters at the following levels, and
numerous users. In this scheme, keys are generated in the same
hierarchical key generation approach as the HIBE scheme. To
express an access policy, HABE uses a disjunctive normal
form where all attributes are administered from the same
domain authority into one conjunctive clause. This scheme
becomes unsuitable for practical implementation when replicas
of the same attributes are administered by other domain au-
thorities. Synchronizing attribute administration might become
a challenging issue with complex organizations that have
multiple domain authorities. Examples of other hierarchical
schemes were introduced in [18], [19].
File Hierarchy Ciphertext Policy Attribute-Based Encryp-
tion (FH-CP-ABE) scheme was introduced in [6]. FH-CP-ABE
proposes a leveled access structure to manage a hierarchical
organization that shares data of various sensitivity. A single
access structure was proposed that represents both the hier-
archy and the access policies of an organization. This access
structure consists of a root node, transport nodes, and leaf
3nodes. The root node and transport nodes are in the form of
gates (i.e. AND or OR). The leaf nodes represent attributes
that are possessed by data users. Based on the possession
of certain attributes, each data user is mapped into specific
transport nodes (certain levels within the hierarchy) based
on the access structure that the user satisfies. If the data
user satisfies a full branch of the access structure, then the
data user is ranked at the root node (highest level within
the hierarchy). Data users ranked at the highest level (root
node) can decrypt a ciphertext of highest sensitivity and any
other ciphertext with less sensitivity in the lower levels of
the hierarchy. The nodes ranked in the lower levels (transport
nodes) can not decrypt any ciphertexts in the levels above.
The main advantage of this scheme is that it provides leveled
access structures which are integrated into a single access
structure. As a result, storage space is saved as only one
copy of the ciphertext is needed to be shared on the cloud
for all data users. However, since this scheme uses a single
access structure to represent the full hierarchy, the higher
levels are forced to accommodate attributes of all the levels
below. As the number of levels increases in the hierarchy, the
number of attributes grows exponentially making this scheme
infeasible on a large scale. The authors in this work also
propose a simplified and reduced access structure to reduce
the computational complexity. They achieve this by removing
all branches of the single access structure while keeping one
full branch. The full branch consists of the root node, a set
of transport nodes (one for each level), and the leaf nodes
(attributes). They claim that not all nodes in the hierarchy
carry information and therefore could be removed. However,
this claim is only applicable to the case where the highest
transport node of each branch to be removed is an OR gate.
This is the least complicated scenario. In the case where the
highest transport node of each branch consists of an AND gate,
this solution is not applicable. Removing branches that consist
of AND gates would change the access policies defined. In
real applications, relationships within an organization are often
built in a cross-functional matrix, making this a complicated
solution when assigning privileges.
III. PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces the preliminaries.
A. Cryptographic Hash Function
A cryptographic hash function h is a mathematical algo-
rithm that maps data of arbitrary size to a bit string of fixed
size. It is cryptographically secure if it satisfies the following
requirements:
• Preimage-Resistance: It should be computationally in-
feasible to find any input for any pre-specified output
which hashes to that output, i.e. for any given y, it
should be computationally infeasible to find an x such
that h(x) = y.
• Week Collision Resistance: For any given x, it should
be computationally infeasible to find x′ 6= x such that
h(x′) = h(x) [20].
• Strong Collision-Resistance: It should be computationally
infeasible to find any two distinct inputs x and x′, such
that h(x) = h(x′) [21], [22].
B. Bilinear Maps
Let G0 and G1 be two multiplicative cyclic groups of the
same prime order p. The generator of G0 is denoted as g. A
bilinear map from G0×G0 to G1 is a function e : G0×G0 →
G1 that satisfies the following properties:
• Bilinearity: e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab for any a, b ∈ Zp.
• Symmetry: e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab = e(gb, ga) for any
a, b ∈ Zp.
• Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1.
• Computability: e(g, g) is an efficiently computable algo-
rithm.
C. Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) Assumption
The DBDH assumption [23] is a computational hardness
assumption and is defined as follows:
Let G0 be a group of prime order p, g be a generator, and
a, b, c ∈ Zp be chosen at random.
It is infeasible for the adversary to distinguish between any
given (g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) and (g, ga, gb, gc, R), where
R ∈r G1 is a random element and ∈r denotes a random
selection. An algorithm A that outputs a guess z ∈ {0, 1},
has advantage ε in solving the DBDH problem in G0 if:∣∣Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, T = e(g, g)abc) = 0]
−Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, T = R) = 0]∣∣ ≥ ε. (1)
The DBDH assumption holds if no polynomial algorithm
has a non-negligible advantage in solving the DBDH problem.
D. Access Structure
An access structure [24] represents access policies for a
set of individuals interested in gaining individual access to
a secret. The access structure defines sets of attributes that
can be possessed by a single individual to allow access to the
secret. It is defined as follows:
Let {P1, . . . , Pn} be a set of parties. A set of parties that can
reconstruct the secret is defined as a collection. The collection
is monotone meaning that, if A ⊆ 2{P1,...,Pn} then ∀B ∈ A
and B ⊆ C implies C ∈ A . An access structure is a monotone
collection A of non-empty subsets {P1, . . . , Pn}, i.e., A ⊆
2{P1,...,Pn} \ ∅. The sets in A are called the authorized sets
and the sets not in A are called the unauthorized sets.
In this paper, we use parties to represent the attributes.
This means that an access structure A may consist of both
authorized and unauthorized sets of attributes.
E. Leveled Access Tree Ti
An access tree Ti at level Li represents an access structure
that determines whether a data user can decrypt the ciphertext
CTi at that level or not. A Ti may consist of multiple nodes.
We use xil ∈ Ti to represent the lth node of Ti. The non-
leaf nodes of Ti are in the form of threshold gates, while the
4leaf nodes represent possible attribute values possessed by data
users.
For every node xil ∈ Ti, a threshold value kxil is assigned. A
node in the form of an AND gate is associated with a threshold
value kxil = numxil , where numxil represents the number of
children of node xil . A node in the form of an OR gate or
any leaf node representing an attribute is associated with a
threshold value kxil = 1.
The root node xi1 of each Ti carries a secret ski. The data
user that possesses the correct set of attributes can satisfy Ti
and obtain ski.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The data owner (DO) owns a data file F and wishes to
share selective parts of it within an organization O. The F
is assumed to consist of either a single record or multiple
records, where each record is composed of one or more record
attributes. The O consists of a large set of data users (DU),
where DU = {DU1, DU2, . . . , DUm} and m represents the
number of data users. Data users in the set DU are ranked
into a hierarchy H to define their privileges and which parts
of F they can gain access to. The H is not fixed nor predefined.
It is defined by the DO as he/she encrypts his/her F . In other
words, the DO ranks the set DU in the O based on his/her
personal needs. The DO defines the H based on an infinite
pool of attributes. This means that the DO can rank the set
DU according to his/her possession of specific attributes sets.
It is important to realize that the DO has the complete freedom
to define the H with any set of attributes without personally
knowing any of the data users in set DU or what they possess
in terms of attribute sets. The H consists of multiple levels
{L1,L2, . . . ,Lk}, where 1 ≤ k ≤ ∞. L1 represents the
highest rank while Lk represents the lowest rank. At each
level Li of the H, the DO defines a leveled access tree Ti,
where 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Each DUj possesses a set of attributes
Aj = {Aj,1, Aj,2 . . . , Aj,n} that ranks them within a certain
level of H. The DUj uses his/her set Aj to request a unique
private key SKj from the key-issuer to use for decryption.
The challenge is to provide a secure and efficient scheme
for the DO to share different segments of F among a set DU,
where each user is ranked differently in H. Each segment of
F has a sensitivity value that defines which users can gain
access to it based on their rank within H. A user at any given
level can gain access to only the segment at his/her level and
all the segments from the respective levels below.
A. System Model
The general model of privilege-based data sharing among
data users of an organization is illustrated in Fig. 1. In the
figure, data users ranked at the higher levels (i.e. possess more
privileges) within the hierarchy are granted access to more
sensitive data than those ranked at lower levels (i.e. possess
fewer privileges). The system consists of four main entities:
key-issuer, cloud server, data owner, and data user.
• Key-issuer: A fully trusted entity that grants private
keys to data users in a system after authenticating their
privileges.
TABLE I: Notations summary
Symbol Definition
DO A data owner
O An organization that consists of multiple data users
H The hierarchical layout of the O
Li The ith level within H where 1 ≤ i ≤ k
Ti The ith access tree at Li where 1 ≤ i ≤ k
Fi The ith data file part where 1 ≤ i ≤ k
ski The ith symmetric key used to encrypt Fi where 1 ≤ i ≤ k
EFi The ith encrypted Fi under ski where 1 ≤ i ≤ k
CTi The ith ciphertext (encrypt ski under Ti) at Li where 1 ≤ i ≤ k
DUj The jth data user in set DU where 1 ≤ j ≤ m
SKj The jth data user’s private key where 1 ≤ j ≤ m
Aj,u
The uth attribute within the jth data user’s attribute set Aj
where 1 ≤ u ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m
xil The l
th node of Ti where 1 ≤ l ≤ ∞ and 1 ≤ i ≤ k
kxi
l
Threshold value of xil where 1 ≤ l ≤ ∞ and 1 ≤ i ≤ k
• Cloud server: A non-trusted entity used to store cipher-
texts.
• Data owner: An individual that owns a data file and
wishes to share it with multiple data users of an orga-
nization selectively based on their data access privileges.
• Data user: An individual that is ranked within a hierarchy
of an organization and is interested in decrypting cipher-
texts on the cloud.
It is a burden on the data owner to share his/her data file
on the cloud as the hierarchy grows (the access privileges
increase in number) and/or as the access restrictions become
more complex due to an increase in the sensitivity of the data
file. The data owner wishes to share the data file on the cloud
in an efficient manner that is not computationally expensive
while minimizing the cloud storage space used.
A trivial solution involves the data owner to use public key
encryption. Every data user’s public key is used to decrypt the
part of the data file they are granted access to. This ensures
that no unprivileged data user will gain access to the data file
even if that user is able to download the ciphertext from the
cloud server. This solution would require the data owner to
encrypt the same part of the data file once for each data user
he/she wishes to grant access to. On a large scale, public key
encryption becomes an inefficient solution due to the increase
in the number of encryptions. It also requires large amounts
of storage space making it expensive.
B. Design Goals
To provide efficient, secure, and privilege-based data sharing
to individuals of an organization, we have the following design
goals:
• Privilege-Based Access: Data is shared in a hierarchical
manner based on user privileges. Data users with more
privileges (ranked at the higher levels of the hierarchy)
are granted access to more sensitive parts of F than those
with fewer privileges (ranked at the lower levels of the
hierarchy).
• Data Confidentiality: All parts of F are completely
protected from the data users that are not privileged
(including the cloud) to access the data. Each data user
is entitled to access the parts of F corresponding to the
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Fig. 1: General scheme of privilege-based data sharing
level they fall in and/or any other parts corresponding to
the levels below with respect to the user’s level.
• Fine-grained access control: The data owner has the
capability to encrypt any part of F using any set of de-
scriptive attributes he/she wishes, limiting access to only
authorized data users. The set of descriptive attributes is
defined by the data owner at the time of encryption.
• Collusion resistant: Two or more data users at the
same/different level can not combine their private keys
to gain access to any part of F they are not authorized
to access independently.
V. THE PROPOSED P-MOD SCHEME
This section presents the construction of P-MOD. We as-
sume that file F is partitioned into k parts based on data
sensitivity. Each part of F is independently encrypted and
shared among the data users of the system under a privilege-
based access structure.
A. Data File Partitioning and Encryption
The DO partitions file F into a set of k data sections, that
is F = {F1, F2, . . . , Fk}. Each Fi ∈ F is treated as a new
file that is associated with a sensitivity value used to assign
access rights to the data users based on their privileges.
The process of partitioning F is performed based on the
structure of F . We assume that F consists of at least one
record, resulting in multiple ways to handle this process. Fig. 2
presents a typical partitioning of F .
If F consists of a single record, then each Fi ∈ F represents
one or more record attribute(s) associated with the record, as
shown in case (1) in Fig. 2. However, if F consists of multiple
records, then DO has flexibility in choosing how to partition
it. One approach is to handle each record as a whole, where
records are clustered into groups of similar sensitivity. In this
case, each Fi ∈ F represents one or more record(s), as shown
case (2) in Fig. 2. Alternatively, partitioning can be performed
over specific record attributes, versus the whole record. In this
case, Fi ∈ F represents one or more record attribute(s) of the
records, as shown case (3) in Fig. 2.
Each Fi ∈ F is treated as a new data file. Suppose F1
contains the most sensitive information of F that can only be
accessed by a data user at the highest level L1 and Fk contains
the least sensitive information of F that can be accessed by
all data users at any level of the hierarchy.
Lowest
Sensitivity
Highest
Sensitivity
Case (1)
...
  F1           F2           Fk
Case (3)
...
  F1           F2           Fk
Case (2)
...
F1
F2
Fk
...
Fig. 2: File partitioning
Before the DO uploads {F1, F2, . . . , Fk} to the cloud, each
Fi ∈ F is encrypted separately using a symmetric encryp-
tion algorithm such as the Advanced Encryption Algorith
(AES) [25] with a secret key ski to produce an encrypted
file EFi.
EFi = Encski(Fi). (2)
For key selection, the DO randomly selects sk1. The re-
maining symmetric keys {sk2, . . . , skk} are derived from sk1
using a public one-way cryptographic hash function h, that is
ski+1 = h(ski). (3)
After ski is used to symmetrically encrypt Fi, it is encrypted
under P-MOD that will be discussed in Section V-C, to be
accessed only by the data users that have been granted the
privilege of access.
The privileged data users that are successful in obtaining
ski at level i can derive {ski+1, . . . , skk} using equation (3).
However, given the properties of hash function h, ski cannot
be used to derive any of the private keys {sk1, . . . , ski−1}. In
other words, a data user can only obtain private keys below
his/her level, but cannot obtain any private keys from the levels
above.
B. Privilege-Based Access Structure
The privileged-based access structure divides an O into
k levels of privileges, {L1,L2, . . . ,Lk}. The DO defines a
Ti at each corresponding Li. Each Ti is associated with
the appropriate leaf nodes (attributes nodes) that define the
privilege level. Each user within the set DU of O falls into
a specific level based on the attributes that the data user
possesses. The data user that possesses the correct set of
attributes which can satisfies Ti at Li is able to gain access to
parts {Fi, Fi+1, . . . , Fk}.
Fig. 3 represents the general privilege-based access structure
of P-MOD. At each Li, a Ti may consist of non-leaf nodes and
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Fig. 3: Privilege-based multilevel access structure
leaf nodes. The non-leaf nodes are in the form of threshold
gates, represented as ‘G’, and the leaf nodes are in the form of
attributes, represented as ‘A’. The figure represents a privilege-
based multilevel access structure. It is important to note that
each Ti could be constructed from any number and layout of
nodes based on the privileges at each level.
The data user is successful in obtaining Fi if and only if
the user possesses a correct set of attributes that satisfy Ti
or any of the access trees {T1, . . . , Ti−1} corresponding to
the higher levels {L1, . . . ,Li−1} in order to obtain any of
{sk1, . . . , ski}.
C. The Proposed P-MOD Construction
The scheme is based on the construction presented in [7]
and formally divides the process into four main functions:
Setup,KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt.
a) Setup(1κ): This is a probabilistic function carried
out by the key-issuer. The Setup function takes a security
parameter κ and randomly chooses values α, β ∈ Zp. The
outputs of this function are public key PK and master key
MK defined as:
PK = {G0, g, B = gβ , e(g, g)α}, (4)
MK = {β, gα}. (5)
b) KeyGen(MK,Aj): This is also a probabilistic func-
tion carried out by the key-issuer. The inputs to this function
are MK generated by the Setup function, and the jth data
user’s attribute set Aj , where Aj,u ∈ Aj represents the uth
attribute within the set. The KeyGen function outputs a unique
private key SKj for the data user. In order to guarantee
a unique SKj , it generates a random value rj ∈ Zp and
incorporates it within the private key. Based on the number
of attributes in the input set Aj , the KeyGen function also
generates a random value rj,u ∈r Zp for each attribute within
the set. The SKj is defined as:
SKj =
(
Dj = g
(α+rj)/β ,
{Dj,u = grj · h(u)rj,u , D′j,u = grj,u | ∀Aj,u ∈ Aj}
)
(6)
The purpose of the randomly selected rj is to ensure that
each SKj is unique and the attribute components within the
SKj are associated. It should be infeasible for data users to
collude by combining components of their private keys (Dj,u
and D′j,u) to decrypt data beyond their individual access rights.
In other words, the attribute components from different private
keys cannot be combined to access unauthorized data.
c) Encrypt(PK,ski,Ti): This is a probabilistic function
carried out by the DO. The inputs to this function are PK,
the public key generated by the Setup function, the symmetric
key ski derived in equation (3), and the access tree Ti that
defines the authorized set of attributes at Li. The output of
this function is the ciphertext CTi.
For sk = {sk1, . . . , skk}, the Encrypt function will run k
times, once for each ski. At each run, the Encrypt function
chooses a polynomial qxil with degree dxil = kxil − 1 for each
node xil ∈ Ti. The process of assigning polynomials to each xil
occurs in a top-bottom approach starting from the root node
in Ti. The Encrypt function chooses a secret s ∈ Zp and
sets the value of qxi1(0) = s. Next, it randomly chooses the
remaining points of the polynomial to completely define it.
For any other node xil ∈ Ti, the Encrypt function sets the
value qxil (0) = qparent(index(x
i
l)), where qparent is x
i
l’s parent
node polynomial. The remaining points of those polynomials
are then randomly chosen.
Let Xi be the set of leaf nodes in Ti. The CTi at Li is then
constructed as:
CTi =
(Ti, C˜i = ski · e(g, g)α·s, Ci = gβ·s,
{Cxil = g
q
xi
l
(0)
, C ′xil = h(x
i
l)
q
xi
l
(0) | ∀xil ∈ Xi}
)
.
(7)
d) Decrypt(CTi, SKj): This is a deterministic function
carried out by the data user. The inputs to this function
are the ciphertext CTi generated by the Encrypt function
corresponding to Li, and the jth data user’s private key SKj .
The Decrypt function operates in a recursive manner prop-
agating through the nodes in Ti by calling a recursive function
defined as DecryptNode(CTi, SKj , xil). The inputs to this
function are CTi, SKj and a node xil within Ti. If the
attributes incorporated within the data user’s private key satisfy
the nodes within Ti, the data user can decrypt CTi.
DecryptNode(CTi, SKj , x
i
l) performs differently depend-
ing on whether xil is a leaf or non-leaf node. If x
i
l is a leaf node
and att(xil) /∈ Aj , DecryptNode(CTi, SKj , xil) returns ∅, oth-
erwise, att(xil) = Aj,u ∈ Aj and DecryptNode(CTi, SKj , xil)
is defined as:
DecryptNode(CTi, SKj , x
i
l) =
e(Dj,u, Cxil )
e(D′j,u, C
′
xil
)
=
e(grj · h(u)rj,u , gqxil (0))
e(grj,u , h(xil)
q
xi
l
(0)
)
= e(g, g)
rj ·qxi
l
(0)
. (8)
If xil is a non-leaf node, DecryptNode(CTi, SKj , x
i
l) op-
erates recursively. For each node zil,c that is a child of x
i
l ,
DecryptNode(CTi, SKj , z
i
l,c) is computed and the output is
stored in Fzil,c .
This recursive function is based on Lagrange interpolation.
The Lagrange coefficient ∆a,Aj for a ∈ Zp and the set of
attributes Aj is defined as:
∆a,Aj (x) =
∏
k∈Aj ,k 6=a
x− k
a− k . (9)
7Let Aj,xil be an arbitrary kxil -sized set of child nodes
zil,c such that Fzil,c 6= ∅. If no such set exists then the
function returns Fzil,c = ∅. Otherwise, Fzil,c is computed using
Lagrange interpolation as follows:
Fxil =
∏
zil,c∈Aj,xi
l
F
∆a,A′
j,xi
l
(0)
zil,c
=
∏
zil,c∈Aj,xi
l
(
e(g, g)
rj ·qzi
l,c
(0)
)∆a,A′
j,xi
l
(0)
=
∏
zil,c∈Aj,xi
l
(
e(g, g)
rj ·qparent(zi
l,c
)
(index(zil,c))
)∆a,A′
j,xi
l
(0)
=
∏
zil,c∈Aj,xi
l
e(g, g)
rj ·qxi
l
(i)·∆a,A′
j,xi
l
(0)
= e(g, g)
rj ·qxi
l
(0)
,
(10)
where a = index(zil,c) and A′j,xil = {index(z
i
l,c) : z
i
l,c ∈
Aj,xil}.
If the attributes in Aj satisfy Ti, then the following is
computed at the root node xi1.
Ri = DecryptNode(CTi, SKj , x
i
1)
= e(g, g)
rj ·qxi1 (0)
= e(g, g)rj ·s.
(11)
To obtain ski from the result derived in equation (11), we
compute the following:
C˜i
e(Ci,Dj)
Ri
=
ski · e(g, g)α·s
e(gβ·s,g(α+rj)/β)
e(g,g)rj ·s
= ski. (12)
At this point, the data user can simply decrypt EFi using
the ski derived from equation (12) to obtain the plaintext Fi
as follows:
Fi = Decski(EFi). (13)
If the data user is successful in obtaining ski and is
interested in attaining any information in the lower levels with
respect to Li, he/she can compute the symmetric keys of the
lower level as previously mentioned in equation (3). All the
data files at the lower levels are decrypted using equation (13).
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, the security of P-MOD is analyzed. It is
assumed that a symmetric encryption technique such as AES
is used to secure each individual data file Fi ∈ F . It is also
assumed that the process of attribute authentication between
a data user and the key-issuer, in order for the data user to
obtain a private key, is secure and efficient. Therefore, the
main focus of this section is to provide a formal proof of
security for P-MOD based on the work presented in [23]. The
security proof provided in this section is based on ciphertext
indistinguishability which proves that the adversary is not
able to distinguish pairs of ciphertexts. A cryptosystem is
considered to be secure under this property if the probability
of an adversary to identify a data file that has been randomly
selected from a two-element data file chosen by the adversary
and encrypted does not significantly exceed 12 . We first present
an Indistinguishability under Chosen-Plaintext Attack (IND-
CPA) security game. Next, based on the IND-CPA security
game, a formal proof of security is provided for P-MOD.
IND-CPA is a game used to test for security of asymmetric
key encryption algorithms. In this game, the adversary is
modeled as a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm. The
algorithms in the game must be completed and the results
returned within a polynomial number of time steps. The
adversary will choose to be challenged on an encryption under
a leveled access tree T ∗. The adversary can impersonate any
data user and request many private keys SKj . However, the
game rules require that any attribute set Aj that the adversary
claims to possess does not satisfy T ∗. The security game is
divided into the following steps:
1) Initialization: The adversary selects an access tree T ∗
to be challenged against and commits to it (i.e. the
adversary will not change it throughout the game).
2) Setup: The challenger runs the Setup function and sends
the public key PK to the adversary.
3) Phase 1: The adversary requests multiple private keys
(SK1, . . . , SKq1 ) corresponding to q1 different sets of
attributes (A1, . . . ,Aq1 ).
4) Challenge: The adversary submits two equal length data
files F0 and F1 to the challenger. The adversary also
sends T ∗ such that none of (SK1, . . . , SKq1 ) generated
from Phase 1 contain correct sets of attributes that
satisfy it. The challenger flips a random coin µ and
encrypts Fµ under T ∗. Finally, the challenger sends the
ciphertext CT ∗ generated according to equation (7) to
the adversary.
5) Phase 2: Repeat phase 1 with the restriction that none
of the newly generated private keys (SKq1+1, . . . , SKq)
corresponding to the q − (q1 + 1) different sets of at-
tributes (Aq1+1, . . . ,Aq) contain correct sets of attributes
that satisfy T ∗.
6) Guess: The adversary outputs a guess µ′ of µ. The
adversary wins the security game if µ′ = µ and loses
otherwise.
Definition 1 (Secure against adaptively chosen plaintext at-
tack.). P-MOD is said to be secure against an adaptively
chosen plaintext attack if any polynomial-time adversary has
only a negligible advantage in the security game, where the
advantage is defined as Adv = Pr[µ′ = µ]− 12 .
The security of P-MOD is reduced to the hardness of the
DBDH problem. By proving that a single CTi at any Li is
secure, the whole system is proved to be secure since all
ciphertexts at any level follow the same rules.
Theorem 1. P-MOD is secure against adaptively chosen
plaintext attack if the DBDH assumption holds.
Proof. Assume there is an adversary that has non-negligible
advantage ε = AdvA. We construct a simulator that can
distinguish a DBDH element from a random element with ad-
8vantage ε. Let e : G0×G0 → G1 be an efficiently computable
bilinear map and G0 is of prime order p with generator g. The
DBDH challenger begins by selecting the random parameters:
a, b, c ∈r Zp. Let g ∈ G0 be a generator and T is defined
as T = e(g, g)abc if µ = 0, and T = R otherwise, where
µ ∈r {0, 1} and R ∈r G1. The simulator acts as the challenger
in the following game:
1) Initialization: The simulator accepts the DBDH chal-
lenge requested by the adversary who selects an access
structure T ∗.
2) Setup: The simulator runs the Setup function. It chooses
a random α∗ ∈r Zp and computes the value α =
α∗ + ab. Next, it simulates e(g, g)α ← e(g, g)α∗+ab =
e(g, g)α
∗
e(g, g)ab and B = gβ ← gb, where b repre-
sents a simulation of the value β. Finally, it sends all
components of PK = {G0, g, B = gβ , e(g, g)α} to the
adversary.
3) Phase 1: In this phase, the adversary requests multiple
private keys (SK1, . . . , SKq1 ) corresponding to q1 dif-
ferent sets of attributes (A1, . . . ,Aq1 ). After receiving
an SKj query for a given set Aj where Aj /∈ T ∗
(i.e. ∀Aj,u ∈ Aj does not satisfy T ∗), the simulator
chooses a random r′j ∈r Zp and defines rj = r′j − b.
Next, it simulates Dj = g(α+rj)/β ← gα/βgrj/β =
g(α
∗+ab)/bg(r
′
j−b)/b. Then, ∀Aj,u ∈ Aj , it selects a ran-
dom rj,u ∈r Zp and simulates Dj,u = grj · h(u)rj,u ←
gr
′
j−bh(u)rj,u and D′j,u ← grj,u . Finally, the sim-
ulated values of SKj = (Dj , {Dj,u, D′j,u | rj,u ∈r
Zp, ∀Aj,u ∈ Aj}) are sent to the adversary.
4) Challenge: The adversary sends two plaintext data files
sk0 and sk1 to the simulator who randomly chooses a
µ ∈r {0, 1} by flipping a coin to select one of the files.
The simulator then runs the Encrypt function and derives
a ciphertext CT ∗. It simulates C˜ = skµ ·e(g, g)α·skµ ←
skµ ·e(g, g)(α∗+ab)c = skµ ·Te(g, g)α∗c, where c repre-
sents a simulation of the value skµ and T = e(g, g)abc.
Next, it simulates C = gβ·skµ ← gbc. Finally, for each
attribute x ∈ X∗ (set of leaf nodes in T ∗) it computes
Cx = g
qx(0) and C ′x = h(x)
qx(0). The simulated values
of CT ∗ = {T ∗, C˜, C, ∀x ∈ X∗ : Cx, C ′x} are then sent
to the adversary.
5) Phase 2: Repeat Phase 1.
6) Guess: The adversary tries to guess the value µ. If
the adversary guesses the correct value, the simulator
outputs 0 to indicate that T = e(g, g)abc, or 1 to indicate
that T = R, a random group element in G1.
Given a simulator A, if T = e(g, g)abc, then CT ∗ is a valid
ciphertext, Adv = ε and
Pr
[A (g, ga, gb, gc, T = e(g, g)abc) = 0] = 1
2
+ ε. (14)
If T = R then C˜ is nothing more than a random value to
the adversary. Therefore,
Pr
[A (g, ga, gb, gc, T = R) = 0] = 1
2
. (15)
From equation (14) and equation (15), we can conclude that
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Fig. 4: CP-ABE utilized in a hierarchical organization
∣∣Pr [A (g, ga, gb, gc, T = e(g, g)abc) = 0]
−Pr [A (g, ga, gb, gc, T = R) = 0]∣∣ = ε. (16)
Therefore, the simulator plays the DBDH game with a non-
negligible advantage and the proof is complete.
VII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we present a performance analysis for P-
MOD. We compare it with two existing schemes, CP-ABE [7]
and FH-CP-ABE [6].
A. CP-ABE in a Hierarchical Organization
CP-ABE [7] handles sharing of independent pieces of data
based on independent access policies. It was not designed to
support a privilege-based access structure (i.e. hierarchical or-
ganization). Therefore, to adapt CP-ABE to a privilege-based
access structure, the Encrypt function runs once for each level.
However, if it were to be used in a hierarchical organization,
there would be a trade off between the key management and
the complexity of the encryption and decryption processes.
Fig. 4 shows the two general cases in which CP-ABE is
utilized to share data with users in a hierarchical organization.
In case (1), key management is favored over encryption
and decryption complexities. The individuals at each level
possess attributes that define their privileges and the private
keys to encrypt the data files. The size of each private
key is therefore optimized and the key management process
becomes less resource-intensive. However, since levels are
independent, attributes must be repeatedly incorporated into
each access tree. As a result, the sizes of the access trees
at lower levels will increase, as shown in case (1) of Fig.
4. For complex organizations with a large number of levels,
the access trees will become even larger. This results in an
increase in encryption and decryption complexities.
On the other hand, case (2) favors minimizing encryption
and decryption complexities over key management. Each data
file is encrypted under an access policy with a set of unique
attributes at each level without considering privileges and
relationships. This results in simpler access trees at each level
9of the hierarchy and therefore lower encryption and decryption
complexities. However, to grant access to an individual at a
specific level, the key-issuer must generate a private key for
that individual that incorporates the attributes at that level and
all the levels below. Complex hierarchies that include a large
number of attributes, could result in complicated key manage-
ment. As a result, private keys will require incorporating a
large number of attributes.
B. Computational Complexity
The computational complexity includes both encryption
complexity and decryption complexity that are formulated
using the number of group operations fG0 , fG1 for groups G0,
G1 respectively and the number of bilinear mapping operations
e involved in the Encrypt and the Decrypt functions for each
scheme.
1) Encryption Complexity: Encryption complexity repre-
sents the number of basic operations involved in generating
the ciphertext from the plaintext. It is formulated based on the
Encrypt function which involves group operations fG0 and
fG1 .
The number of operations involved in sharing an indepen-
dent piece of data using CP-ABE is (2|X| + 1) and 2 for
fG0 and fG1 respectively, where |X| denotes the number of
leaf nodes (attributes) of the access tree T . For a hierarchical
organization, we present the encryption complexity of case (1)
in Fig. 4 as it involves a relationship between all levels. In a
real life application, case (2) would not satisfy a hierarchical
organization as it requires attributes to be shared by all
users regardless which level they belong to. The number of
operations involved in the encryption process is formulated
as (2(|X1| + · · · + |Xk|) + k) and 2k for fG0 and fG1 re-
spectively, where |X1|, |X2|, · · · , |Xk| are the number of leaf
nodes (attributes) associated with access trees T1, T2, · · · , Tk
respectively. However, reuse of attributes needed at each level
in this scheme increases the computational complexity, making
it an overall inefficient solution for hierarchical organizational
structures.
FH-CP-ABE [6] uses a single access tree T to encrypt all
data files to be shared. The Encrypt function only needs to run
once for all data files to generate a single ciphertext. The num-
ber of operations involved are (2|X|+k) and (2v|AT |+2k) for
operations fG0 and fG1 respectively, where |AT | is the number
of transport nodes (levels), and v is the number of children
nodes associated with a transport node. The single access
structure merges access policies across levels into one large
policy. The combined policy grants users access at different
levels. This results in large sets X , AT and v. The encryption
complexity in this scheme is dependent on the size of these
sets and can grow exponentially depending on how the access
tree T is constructed.
P-MOD generates multiple ciphertexts (one at each level) of
the hierarchy. The number of operations involved is (2(|Y1|+
· · · + |Yk|) + k) and 2k for fG0 and fG1 respectively, where
|Y1|, |Y2|, · · · , |Yk| are the number of leaf nodes (attributes)
associated with access trees T1, T2, · · · , Tk respectively. How-
ever, P-MOD leverages the relation between levels of a hi-
erarchy. Therefore, it does not require reuse of attributes in
levels like CP-ABE. In this case, |Y1|, |Y2|, · · · , |Yk| are all
specific to each level minimizing the number of attributes in
each access tree. As a result, |Yi| < |Xi|,∀i ∈ k. Therefore,
the encryption complexity of P-MOD outperforms that of CP-
ABE.
When comparing the encryption complexities of P-MOD
with FH-CP-ABE, P-MOD minimizes the number of op-
erations involved in contrast to those needed by FH-CP-
ABE. This is because the encryption process for FH-CP-ABE
involves an access tree that contains all the access policies for
all the levels in contrast to P-MOD which involves smaller
access trees, each one limited to an access policy of a single
level. As a result, when comparing the encryption complexity
of these two schemes, P-MOD is more efficient than FH-CP-
ABE.
2) Decryption Complexity: Decryption complexity repre-
sents the number of basic operations involved in decrypting
the ciphertext into plaintext. It is formulated based on the
Decrypt function which involves bilinear operations e and
group operations fG1 .
For a single Decrypt run, CP-ABE [7] involves (2|Aj |) and
(2|S|+2) number of operations e and fG1 respectively, where
|Aj | is the number of attributes possessed by the jth data user
and |S| is the least number of interior nodes that satisfy T .
To adapt CP-ABE to a privilege-based access structure, the
Decrypt function is run as many times as the number of cipher-
texts a data user wishes to decrypt. The number of operations
involved are k(2|Aj |+ 1) and (2[|S1|+ · · ·+ |Sk|] + 2k) for
operations e and fG1 respectively, where |S1|, |S2|, · · · , |Sk|
are the least number of interior nodes that satisfy the access
trees T1, T2, · · · , Tk respectively.
FH-CP-ABE [6] aims to satisfy a certain transport node
(level) of the single access tree T allowing the data user to
decrypt certain encrypted files up to that level. To accomplish
this, the Decrypt function propagates through the access tree
nodes recursively to make sure that the user’s attributes satisfy
the nodes. The number of operations involved in this process
are (2|Aj |+ 1) and (2|S|+ v|AT |+ 2k) for operations e and
fG1 respectively.
Since FH-CP-ABE uses a single access tree T , the number
of transport nodes |AT | can be large, resulting in higher
decryption complexity. The least number of interior nodes |S|
that satisfy T can also be large if the construction of the access
tree T is not optimized. Constructing a single access tree
that accommodates a large number of attributes is resource-
intensive and could become complicated as the access rules
become more sophisticated.
The number of operations involved in the decryption process
for P-MOD is similar to a single CP-ABE decryption run. P-
MOD needs to run the Decrypt(CTi, SKj) function only one
time, even if the data user needs to obtain more than one data
file. The Decrypt function requires (2|Aj |) and (2|S| + 2)
for operations e and fG1 respectively. Once the data user
successfully decrypts the ciphertext (obtains the symmetric
key at his/her level), the user can derive the remaining lower
level keys as described in equation (3). The complexity of
the operations involved in deriving the symmetric keys and
decrypting ciphertexts at the lower levels are negligible in
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comparison with the group and bilinear operations involved in
running the Decrypt function, and therefore could be ignored.
When comparing the decryption complexities of P-MOD
and FH-CP-ABE, P-MOD’s decryption complexity depends
on |Aj | and |S| while FH-CP-ABE’s decryption complexity
depends on |S|, v, |AT | and k. The size of the sets in FH-
CP-ABE will always be greater than the size of the sets in P-
MOD due to the different constructions of access trees in each
scheme. In conclusion, P-MOD outperforms FH-CP-ABE.
C. Storage Efficiency
The following analysis presents the space needed for keys
and ciphertext storage in each scheme. The bit-length of the
different keys involved and the ciphertexts generated in each
scheme are presented. The bit-length of a single element in G0,
G1 and Zp are denoted as LG0 , LG1 and LZp respectively.
1) Key Size: Key size represents the bit-length of a gener-
ated key. Three different types of keys are generated for each
scheme: a public key, a master key, and user private keys.
The sizes of keys for all schemes are formulated the same
way. The public key and master key are formulated based on
the output of the Setup function. The public key consists of 3
elements from G0 and a single element from G1. The master
key consists of a single element from each of G0 and Zp.
The private key size of a single user is formulated based
on the output of the KeyGen function. It consists of (2|Aj |+
1) elements from G0, where |Aj | is the number of attributes
possessed by the jth data user.
2) Ciphertext Size: Ciphertext size represents the bit-length
of the ciphertext. Ciphertext size is based on the output of the
Encrypt function for each scheme.
For CP-ABE, the total size of all generated ciphertexts from
all levels consists of (2(|X1| + · · · + |Xk|) + k) elements
from G0 and k elements from G1. Using this scheme, the
lower levels must accommodate attributes of the higher levels.
Ciphertext size can potentially end up large in size due to
attribute replication at each level.
The single ciphertext generated by FH-CP-ABE [6] consists
of (2|X|+k) elements from G0 and (v|AT |+k) elements from
G1. In this scheme, the ciphertext size depends on |X|, |AT |,
v and k. As the size of these sets grow, the ciphertext size can
grow exponentially based on how the tree T is constructed.
P-MOD generates ciphertexts in a similar approach to
those generated by CP-ABE. The total size of all generated
ciphertexts consists of (2[|Y1| + · · · + |Yk|] + k) elements
from G0 and k elements from G1. However, the size of
the ciphertext generated by P-MOD is shown to be smaller
in size than CP-ABE in all instances. This is based on the
composition of P-MOD’s access structure which does not
duplicate attributes, therefore generating smaller ciphertexts.
In conclusion, P-MOD minimizes the number of attributes in
each leveled access tree and therefore minimizes the size of
the ciphertexts.
VIII. SIMULATIONS
In this section, the results of various simulations are pre-
sented to support the performance analysis discussed in Sec-
tion VII. P-MOD is implemented and simulated in Java using
the CP-ABE toolkit [26] and the Java Pairing-Based Cryptog-
raphy library (JPBC) [27]. For comparison, simulations are
also conducted for CP-ABE [7] and FH-CP-ABE [6] under
the same conditions as P-MOD. All simulations are conducted
on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-4200M at 2.50 GHz and 4.00 GB
RAM machine running the Windows 10 operating system.
In the simulations, the number of levels k is equivalent to
the number of file partitions being shared. The total number
of different user attributes applied to users across all levels
within H is represented as N . Both variables are compared for
key generation time-cost, encryption time-cost, and decryption
time-cost. The experiments include applying the values for
k = {3, 6, 9}, to each value of N = {10, 100}, resulting
in 6 experimental cases. Within each case, it is possible to
distribute the user attributes among the levels in numerous
ways. For example, when testing the schemes with a hierarchy
H for k = 3 and N = 10, there are 36 different ways to
distribute the 10 user attributes among the 3 levels, excluding
the cases of having zero user attributes at any level. A possible
way of distributing them could be AL1 = 3, AL2 = 3 and
AL3 = 4, where AL1 represents the set of user attributes
possessed by users in the highest level within H and AL3 the
set of user attributes possessed by users in the lowest level.
As the values of k and N increase, the possible ways of user
attribute distribution among all levels increases. Without loss
of generality, we assume that the number of attributes for each
level follows the normal distribution in our simulations.
The data set used in the simulations is sampled from the
Census Income data set [28]. The sample consists of 30,163
records, and each record is composed of 9 different record
attributes. The records are stored in a Microsoft Excel file F ,
with a total size of 2.42MB. For simulation purposes, it is
assumed that data sensitivity is defined over record attributes
(vertical columns), corresponding to the second approach
described in Section V-A.
F is partitioned into k sections, where ∀Fi ∈ F and 1 ≤
i ≤ k, each Fi represents one or more full columns of F .
Table IV represents the 9 record attributes distribution of F
into each partition Fi, based on the given value for k in each
scenario.
All simulations are performed in consideration of users at
the most sensitive (highest) level within the hierarchy. This
approach considers the most complicated applications, where
a user needs to gain access to the entire file. Fig. 5 summarizes
the time expended by the three schemes to generate a private
key for the user, encrypt all partitions of F and decrypt all
partitions respectively, in all 6 scenarios. By analyzing the
figures, some observations can be derived. The results are
summarized in the following sections.
A. Key Generation Time-Cost
To measure the time to generate a private key for a user,
the same attribute and level conditions are applied to all three
schemes. P-MOD outperforms CP-ABE and FH-CP-ABE in
all experimental evaluations. As illustrated in Fig. 5(a), the
time taken to generate a private key for a user at the highest
level in CP-ABE and FH-CP-ABE, is independent of the value
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TABLE II: Computational complexity summary
Number of operations
Complexity Operation CP-ABE FH-CP-ABE P-MOD
Encryption
fG0 2(|X1|+ · · ·+ |Xk|) + k 2|X|+ k 2(|Y1|+ · · ·+ |Yk|) + k
fG1 2k 2v|AT |+ 2k 2
Decryption
e k(2|Aj |+ 1) 2|Aj |+ 1 2|Aj |
fG1 2(|S1|+ · · ·+ |Sk|) + 2k 2|S|+ v|AT |+ 2k 2|S|+ 2
TABLE III: Storage efficiency summary
Number of elements
Component Bit-length CP-ABE FH-CP-ABE P-MOD
Public Key
LG0 3 3 3
LG1 1 1 1
Master Key
LZp 1 1 1
LG0 1 1 1
Secret Key LG0 2|Aj |+ 1 2|Aj |+ 1 2|Aj |+ 1
Ciphertext
LG0 2(|X1|+ · · ·+ |Xk|) + k 2|X|+ k 2(|Y1|+ · · ·+ |Yk|) + k
LG1 k v|AT |+ k k
TABLE IV: Attribute distribution in each partition Fi
k F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 F9
3 2 3 4 - - - - - -
6 1 1 1 2 2 2 - - -
9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
of k and remains nearly constant when N is kept constant, for
both values of N = {10, 100} tested.
In comparison, P-MOD reacts differently. When the total
number of user attributes is normally distributed among the
levels, the time taken to generate a private key by P-MOD
is approximately the reciprocal of the value of k multiplied
by the equivalent time taken by CP-ABE or FH-CP-ABE to
perform the same function. For example, the time taken by CP-
ABE and FH-CP-ABE in the case where k = 6 and N = 100
is approximately 2.2 seconds. The time taken by P-MOD in
the same conditions is approximately 0.35 seconds, which is
nearly 16 times the time-cost of the other schemes. Therefore,
the time taken to generate a private key by P-MOD is inversely
proportional to the value of k in the hierarchy. This is true for
a constant value N with normally distributed attributes.
Another observation that can be made from Fig. 5(a) is
the effect of the values N on the time expended. The time-
cost is directly related to the value N and the degree of this
proportional increase is different for each scheme as the value
N increases.
We define variable δ as the difference in time-cost of two
experimental evaluations of the same scheme at N = 10 and
N = 100, while keeping k fixed. In Fig. 5(a), consider the
simulated values for each scheme at k = 9. Both CP-ABE and
FH-CP-ABE result in large time-cost changes, approximately
δCP−ABE = 19039ms and δFH−CP−ABE = 18821ms, while
P-MOD results in a smaller value, δP−MOD = 2204ms.
Based on these values, δP−MOD is approximately 11.7% of
δCP−ABE and δFH−CP−ABE, resulting in an approximately
88.3% improvement. The significance of this observation can
be seen in applications where N is a large value. Efficiency
can be gained in time expenditure by utilizing P-MOD, versus
CP-ABE and FH-CP-ABE.
B. Encryption Time-Cost
The encryption time-cost is the time it takes by each scheme
to perform the encryption function over all partitions of F . Fig.
5(b) represents the time expenditure of each scheme under all
six experimental scenarios. P-MOD surpasses both CP-ABE
and FH-CP-ABE in every experimental case. For example,
compare the time duration of the three schemes at k = 9 and
N = 100. The time duration for CP-ABE is approximately
4.3 times of P-MOD to perform encryption. Similarly, FH-
CP-ABE is approximately 1.2 times of P-MOD to perform
encryption.
All schemes follow a direct proportional pattern as the
values k and N increase. These results prove the correctness
of the encryption computational complexity analysis presented
in Section VII-B1. The encryption function in all schemes in-
volves a number of fG0 and fG1 operations that are dependent
on both the values k and N . However, based on P-MOD’s
enhanced hierarchical structure, it is able to outperform both
CP-ABE and FH-CP-ABE. In addition to this, the effect of
changing the value N is also illustrated clearly in Fig. 5(b).
For example, when k = 9, δP−MOD is approximately 21.6%
of δCP−ABE and approximately 82% of δFH−CP−ABE.
C. Decryption Time-Cost
As previously discussed, the experiments are performed in
the perspective of a user that appears at the highest level of the
hierarchy. Taking this into account, the decryption time-cost
is defined as the time for the user to successfully decrypt all
ciphertexts EFi corresponding to all partitions Fi, if the user
possesses the correct set of user attributes. Fig. 5(c) illustrates
the time to perform the decryption function by each scheme.
The decryption function of both CP-ABE and FH-CP-ABE
both involve e and fG1 operations that are dependent on the
values k and N . As these values increase, the decryption
time-cost increases linearly for both schemes, proving the
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Fig. 5: Performance comparison: (a) Key generation time, (b) Encryption time, and (c) Decryption time
correctness of the decryption complexity analysis in Section
VII-B2.
When measuring the decryption time-cost, P-MOD outper-
forms both CP-ABE and FH-CP-ABE. This is due to the time-
cost being inversely proportional to the value of k. The time-
cost decreases as the value of k increases while N is kept
constant.
P-MOD’s decryption time-cost does not severely increase
while the value N changes from 10 to 100. In contrast
to this, CP-ABE and FH-CP-ABE are greatly affected, as
seen in Fig. 5(c). For example, when k = 9, δP−MOD is
approximately 13.4% of δCP−ABE and approximately 15.8%
of δFH−CP−ABE. The decryption time-cost of P-MOD is
expected to drop when k increases while keeping the file size
constant.
In summary, for a hierarchical organization with many
levels, the simulation results show that P-MOD is significantly
more efficient at generating keys, encryption, and decryption
than that of both CP-ABE and FH-CP-ABE schemes.
IX. CONCLUSION
The numerous benefits provided by the cloud have driven
many large multilevel organizations to store and share their
data on it. This paper begins by pointing out major security
concerns data owners have when sharing their data on the
cloud. Next, the most widely implemented and researched
data sharing schemes are briefly discussed revealing points
of weakness in each. To address the concerns, this paper
proposes a Privilege-based Multilevel Organizational Data-
sharing scheme (P-MOD) that allows data to be shared
efficiently and securely on the cloud. P-MOD partitions a
data file into multiple segments based on user privileges and
data sensitivity. Each segment of the data file is then shared
depending on data user privileges. We formally prove that
P-MOD is secure against adaptively chosen plaintext attack
assuming the DBDH assumption holds. Our comprehensive
performance comparison with the two most representative
schemes shows that P-MOD can significantly reduce the
computational complexity while minimizing the storage space.
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